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JUDICIAL SALES - RIGHT TO SET AsmE A SuccESSFUL Bro - At a public
sale, the trustee in bankruptcy struck off to the plaintiff a bankrupt's assets for
$16,850, a reasonable price. A referee vacated the sale wlien a private bidder
offered $150 more and insured reopening of the bankrupt's mines and employment of its former employees. The sale was finally confirmed to the private
bidder at a price only $50 in excess of the final offer made by the highest bidder
at the public auction. Plaintiff appealed to the court to review the referee's
order. Held, although the courts do not generally approve of vacating a fair
public sale in favor of only a slightly higher private bid, the interest of the public
in maintaining employment for a bankrupt's employees justified the reopening
in this instance. In re Prairie Coal Co., (D. C. Ill. 1941) 40 F. Supp. 894.
At a regular auction conducted without conditions, the sale is consummated
when the property is knocked down; and title is vested in the buyer at that
moment.1 However, in a judicial sale such as in the principal case,2 title to the
goods remains with the seller until the sale is confirmed by the court, and the
purchaser is generally considered to have no definite legal right until that time.
At most, the sale confers a preferred position upon the bidder,8 and the courts are

1 ln re Packard Press, (C. C. A. 2d, 1924) 3 F. (2d) 232; Lucas v. Wallace, 42
Ill. App. 172 (1891); 7 C. J. S. 1260 (1937).
.
2 A trustee's sale in bankruptcy procedure is a judicial sale. In re Ewing, Jr.,
(C. C. Ind. 1883) 16 F. 753; CoulJer v. Blieden, (C. C. A. 8th, 1939) 104 F.
(2d) 29, quoting with approval 6 REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY, 4th ed.,§ 2552 (1937).
8 Levy v. Broadway-Carmen Building Corp., 366 Ill. 279, 8 N. E. (2d) 671
(1937); Perry v. Perry, 179 N. C. 445, 102 S. E. 772 (1920); Terry v. Coles' Exr.,
So Va. 695 (1885). The explanation is that the contract of sale is between the bidder
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given a wide amount of discretion in the matter of confirmation. However, a
court cannot abuse its discretion and should vacate a sale only upon recognized
legal principles.4 In Illinois, where the sale in the principal case was conducted,
and in most jurisdictions, the law will not recognize an advanced bid, offered
after the auction has closed, as sufficient grounds for setting the public sale aside.
This is so if the latter has brought an adequate price even if the increased offer
was such as to be of substantial benefit to the parties involved. 5 To do so, the
courts feel, would discourage bidding at the sale and prevent property from
bringing its true value. 6 Even if the public sale brings an inadequate price, that
and the court, not the bidder and the trustee. See Hart v. Burch, I 30 Ill. 426, 22
N. E. 831 (1889); 6 REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY, 4th ed.,§ 2552 (1937); 91 CENT.
L. J. 3 ( 1920). The courts are not clear as to the exact nature of the bidder's "preferred" position. In Arkansas it is admitted that there is no passage of title until confirmation but the court feels that enough rights are vested in the prospective purchaser at
the auction to consider the sale consummated when the goods are struck off rather than
when the court approves the bid. Robertson v. McClintock, 86 Ark. 255, I IO S. W.
1052 (1908). In certain respects it would seem that title is sometimes treated as having
been conveyed at the public sale. Thus, losses through destruction or depreciation
between the auction and confirmation have been held to fall on the purchaser. Morrison
v. Burnette, (C. C. A. 8th, 1907) 154 F. 617 at 623. New Jersey explains this by
saying that the goods are put in trust for the highest bidder as soon as the sale is closed.
Cropper v. Brown, 76 N. J. Eq. 406, 74 A. 987 (1909). Employing a familiar fiction,
consistent with the general theory that no title passes by the sale alone, Alabama declares that the vendee suffers the loss because the confirmation relates back to the
auction. Haralson v. George's Exr., 56 Ala. 295 ( I 876). Some courts and legal
writers, minimizing the effect of the knockdown at the public sale, feel that the risks
stay with the seller until confirmation. In re Finks, (C. C. A. 6th, 1915) 224 F. 92;
6 REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY, 4th ed.,§ 2558 (1937); RoREJl., JUDICIAL SALES,§ 13
(1873). See generally, 35 C. J. 87 (1924). That the transaction is more than a
nullity is evidenced by the general agreement that the purchaser is bound by his bid
as soon as the goods are struck off. Archer v. Archer, 155 N. Y. 415, 50 N. E. 55 ·
(1898); 31 AM. JuR. 50-9-510 (1940). It has been suggested that this lack of concurrence between liability of the purchaser and conveyance of the title may put the
buyer in an anomalous position. Camden v. Mahew, 129 U. S. 73 at 86, 9 S. Ct. 246
(1888).
4 ln re Wolke Lead Batteries Co., (C. C. A. 6th, 1923) 294 F. 509; Auerbach v.
Wolf, 22 App. D. C. 538 (1903); Quigley v. Breckenridge, 180 Ill. 627, 54 N. E.
580 (1899); 31 AM. JuR. 458-459 (1940).
5 George v. Norwood, 77 Ark. 216, 91 S. W. 557 (1905); Chicago City Bank
& Trust Co. v. Johnson, 293 Ill. App. 564, 13 N. E. (2d) 191 (1938); Morisse
v. Inglis, 46 N. J. Eq. 306, 19 A. 16 (1889); 31 AM. JuR. 453-454 (1940). A few
states still follow the old English rule that the court will reopen the sale if any offer
substantially in excess of the successntl bid at the auction (usually ten.per cent or more)
is received before confirmation. Attorney General v. Roanoke Navigation Co., 86
N. C. 409 (1882); Irby v. Irby, 79 Tenn. 165 (1883). See also II A. L. R. 399
(1921); 71 A. L. R. 674 (1931). This rule proved so unsatisfactory in England that
it was abolished by an act of Parliament. Sale of Land by Auction Act, 30 & 31 Viet.,
c. 48 (1867).
6 Morrison v. Burnette, (C. C. A. 8th, 1907) I 54 F. 617 at 625; Crist v.
McCoy, 287 Ill. 641, 122 N. E. 857 (1919); Alms & Doepke Co. v. Gates, 17 Ky.
L. Rep. 908, 32 S. W. 1088 (1895).
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fact alone does not constitute sufficient cause for setting the sale aside unless the
price is so low that fraud can be imputed.7 Generally, an inadequacy of price
must exist concurrently with some irregularity, fraud, or mistake which directly
affected the sale before a court can order an annulment. 8 In an effort to maintain the stability of judicial sales, the interests of third parties 9 and other circumstances not directly connected with the sale 10 are usually disregarded when
determining whether or not to accept a bid. The principal case, which supposedly was decided in accordance with Illinois authority,11 reveals neither inadequacy of price nor irregularities in the sale; and the advance in the subsequent
private bid was too slight to warrant juclicial recognition.12 The controlling
factor in the decision was that the private bidder assured the court that he would
give employment to the bankrupt's former employees, while the successful bidder
at the public sale seems not to have committed himself on that -point. The interests of the parties to the public sale were abandoned out of concern for a group
having no direct connection with the proceedings. From the sociological standpoint, perhaps much can be said for the conclusion of the court.13 Nevertheless,
the recognition of a power of the courts to set aside bids because of factors only
incidentally related to the sale is not only an extension of the usual rule, but
appears to be in conflict with the purposes of the courts in Illinois and elsewhere.
A general concession of this power would likely do much to stifle the competitive bidding which the courts have tried so hard to protect.

7 Rader v. Bussey, 313 Ill. 226, 145 N. E. 192 (1924); Rohrs v. McGlasson, 250
Ky. 140, 61 S. W. (2d) 1087 (1933).
8 Polk v. Amick, 168 Ark. 903, 271 S. W. 962 (1925); Wilson v. Ford, 190
Ill. 614, 60 N. E. 876 (1901); 6 REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY, 4th ed.,§ 2555 (1937).
9 Bright v. Bright, So Tenn. 630 (1883).
1 ° Kauffman & Runge v. Morriss, 60 Tex. II9 (1883); 35 C. J. 105 (1924).
11 It appears that the federal courts are to follow state common law even in bankruptcy proceedings. See Geist v. Prudence Realization Corp., (C. C. A. 2d, 1941)
122 F. (2d) 503, noted 40 MICH. L. REv. 739 (1942).
12 Even the courts which follow the old English rule generally demand an increase
of ten per cent to warrant setting the sale aside. 3 l AM. JUR. 45 2 ( l 940) ; l l A. L. R.
399 at400 (1921); 71 A. L. R. 674 (1931). In the principal case the initial increase
( $ 150) was less than one per cent and the ultimate advance was a third of that.
13 However, even this sociological ground would not support the decision if
extrinsic facts indicated that the private bidder did not intend to operate the property.

